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RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 6282
RUEHSO/AMCONSUL SAO PAULO 2252
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 8156

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BRASILIA 000843

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

STATE FOR EEB/CIP/TS: SLETT, DHAY

E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: [ECON](#) [ECPS](#) [MARR](#) [PINR](#) [TSPA](#) [BR](#)

SUBJECT: BRAZIL: SATELLITE PIRACY MONITORING HAS BEGUN--SLOWLY

SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED - PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY

REF: (A) GSarrano/DMay/Slett e-mails 16 June, 28 May 2008
(B) Letter to ANATEL 13 May 2008
(C) STATE 29253

¶1. (SBU) Summary: Following up on Ref. C demarche regarding U.S. military satellite interference by Brazilian radio operators, Brazilian telecommunications regulatory agency, ANATEL POC indicated during a telcon on 9 June that monitoring will take place over the next at least two months and then a plan to arrest and prosecute the perpetrators will be worked out with Federal Police in order to attack the problem comprehensively. Post believes this timeframe is not ideal from USG perspective. Post recommends interagency provide, if possible, information requested by GOB to assist its investigation efforts (see para 8). End Summary.

¶2. (SBU) Econoff spoke with Nei Jobson da Costa Carneiro ("Jobson"), a Regulation Technician with the ANATEL division which controls radio frequency spectrum, on 28 May and telephoned Jobson again on 9 June. Until further notice, Jobson is our ANATEL POC on this issue, tel. # is 55-61-2312-1751, cell 55-61-9117-7200.

¶3. (SBU) Jobson indicated ANATEL is taking this situation very seriously and has developed a "synchronized, comprehensive plan of action" jointly with ABIN, the GOB's intelligence agency, and the Federal Police, up to and including possible arrest/judicial processing of the perpetrators.

¶4. (SBU) During both telcons with Econoff, Jobson stressed that the USG needs to have patience in order for the GOB to execute the plan systemically and nationwide and truly resolve the problem long-term, rather than provide a temporary solution. Previous experience has shown ANATEL that approaching this type of interference on a case-by-case basis does not resolve the issue for more than a few months. Econoff indicated both times we understand that concern, but also highlighted the importance to our military that this problem be resolved ASAP.

¶5. (SBU) Econoff in both conversations with Jobson reiterated USG offer of assistance (in the form of a team with specialized equipment available to travel to Brazil at Brazil's invitation), indicating that we have equipment and processes/methodologies which perhaps could be of assistance. Both times, Jobson indicated that the GOB would conduct its own monitoring, but conceded that it would not be feasible as a 24/7 operation due to lack of resources and in order to not draw excessive attention to the monitoring. Nonetheless, offers of sending a USG team and equipment to assist were not accepted at this point; nor were offers from Post to meet with ANATEL and ABIN.

¶6. (SBU) Jobson indicated the GOB plan is to monitor the transmissions "over the next two months or so" and try to track

patterns, thus making actual engagement with the perpetrators more effective. He said they would be monitoring activity a couple of days each week during this time period to see what kind of patterns of frequency interference, if any, emerge. They will also be investigating sales of equipment, including internet sales, to try to cut off the suppliers that are contributing to the problem. The "dossier" will then be shared with the Federal Police and Ministry of Foreign Relations (MRE). The GOB's concern is that if they send a team out into the field for a large-scale operation too quickly, and they have not yet identified all the perpetrators, it would be easy for the perpetrators to alert other satellite pirates about the raid. This would lead them to temporarily suspend operations and/or hide or destroy their equipment-only to have the problem re-emerge at a later date.

17. (SBU) When asked if the GOB could share its monitoring plan with the USG so that the USG might be able to supplement GOB efforts, Jobson demurred, saying he would have to get permission from ABIN to share the plan and was not confident the intelligence agency would agree. That said, he encouraged USG monitoring above and beyond what the GOB can do, saying the USG should feel free to do so and share the information with GOB in order to assist them in apprehending the perpetrators. Econoff committed to pass this proposal to Washington.

18. (SBU) Action items for Washington: As mentioned in Ref. A, Jobson said during both telcons that the USG could be very helpful if we could assist the GOB as follows: a) Supply satellite photos of the interference (pinpointing times, locations, etc. b) Provide recordings of the perpetrators' voices and what was said to assist in judicial processes down the road--processes that could help serve as a deterrent in future. In addition, in more recent

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conversations, Econoff was told that an update to the written tracking information on interference to supplement the report provided by the U.S. military which went up to Jan. 2008 might help the GOB to determine any new or increased usage, if this information can be provided. The GOB's intent, Jobson reiterated, is to arrest and prosecute as many of the responsible persons as possible, both to avoid a recurrence of interference by current perpetrators and to serve as a more severe deterrent to future perpetrators.

19. (SBU) COMMENT: Post takeaway is that GOB is receptive to receiving any further information on the interference that Washington may have, but probably will not take direct enforcement action for at least a couple of months pending its own monitoring. To date, ANATEL has not/not been enthusiastic regarding the offer to send a USG team to Brazil to assist. END COMMENT

SOBEL